- Added afp_monitor.rs module to track AFP_AfpInfo backup_time - Open struct now has 'modified' flag to track file modifications - write.rs sets modified=true on successful write - close.rs calls AfpMonitor::update_backup_time() on modified files - create.rs calls AfpMonitor::init_afp_info() on new file creation - AFP_AfpInfo stored as xattr com.apple.aapl.AfpInfo - backup_time updated to current epoch time on modification Also includes: - LZ4 compression using lz4_flex crate - Case sensitivity conditional on backend capabilities - LDAP cfg feature gate fix - RAID rebuild reconstruction implementation - DOS attributes xattr persistence - Snapshot disk persistence Tests: 201 smb-server, 452 markbase-core (653 total)
496 lines
18 KiB
Rust
496 lines
18 KiB
Rust
//! SMB3 encryption — AES-128-GCM / AES-128-CCM (MS-SMB2 §2.2.41, §3.1.4.3).
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//!
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//! Uses AEAD modes with the SMB2 TRANSFORM_HEADER as AAD
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//! (Additional Authenticated Data). Key derivation follows
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//! SP 800-108 CTR-mode KDF (MS-SMB2 §3.1.4.2), re-using the
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//! existing [`crate::proto::crypto::kdf::smb2_kdf`] primitive.
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//!
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//! Supported ciphers:
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//! * AES-128-GCM — 12-byte nonce, parallelisable, SMB 3.1.1+ (Windows 10+)
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//! * AES-128-CCM — 11-byte nonce, sequential, SMB 3.0 (Windows 8)
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use aes_gcm::{
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aead::{Aead, KeyInit, Payload as GcmPayload},
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Aes128Gcm as Aes128GcmCipher, Nonce as GcmNonce,
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};
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use binrw::{binrw, BinWrite, BinRead, io::Cursor, Endian};
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use ccm::{
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aead::{Aead as CcmAead, KeyInit as CcmKeyInit, Payload as CcmPayload},
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Ccm as Aes128CcmCipher, Nonce as CcmNonce,
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};
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use aes::Aes128;
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use thiserror::Error;
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type Aes128Ccm = Aes128CcmCipher<Aes128, typenum::U16, typenum::U11>;
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// Re-export common AEAD traits for callers that need them.
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pub use aes_gcm::aead::generic_array::typenum;
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#[derive(Debug, Error)]
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pub enum EncryptionError {
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#[error("Invalid transform header signature")]
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InvalidSignature,
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#[error("Unsupported cipher algorithm: {0}")]
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UnsupportedCipher(u16),
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#[error("Encryption failed: {0}")]
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EncryptionFailed(String),
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#[error("Decryption failed: {0}")]
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DecryptionFailed(String),
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#[error("Invalid key length")]
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InvalidKeyLength,
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#[error("Session key not set")]
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NoSessionKey,
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}
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/// SMB2 TRANSFORM_HEADER (MS-SMB2 §2.2.41) — 56 bytes.
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///
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/// For AES-128-GCM:
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/// * Nonce = 12 bytes (first 12 of the 16-byte field; last 4 reserved).
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/// * Signature = GCM authentication tag (16 bytes).
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///
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/// For AES-128-CCM:
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/// * Nonce = 11 bytes (first 11 of the 16-byte field; last 5 reserved).
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/// * Signature = CCM authentication tag (16 bytes).
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///
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/// In both cases AAD = entire header except the signature + encrypted data.
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#[binrw]
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#[brw(big, magic = 0x534D4272u32)] // "SMBr" — SMB3 encrypted protocol id
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pub struct TransformHeader {
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#[brw(little)]
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pub cipher_algorithm: u16, // 0x0001 = AES-128-GCM, 0x0002 = AES-128-CCM
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#[brw(little)]
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pub cipher_key_length: u16, // 16 bytes
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#[brw(little)]
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pub nonce: [u8; 16], // 12 (GCM) or 11 (CCM) bytes used, rest reserved
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#[brw(little)]
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pub session_id: u64,
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#[brw(little)]
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pub original_message_size: u32,
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#[brw(little)]
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pub reserved1: u16,
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#[brw(little)]
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pub reserved2: u16,
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pub signature: [u8; 16], // AEAD authentication tag
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// EncryptedData follows (variable length)
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}
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impl TransformHeader {
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pub const SIZE: usize = 56;
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pub fn write_to_bytes(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, EncryptionError> {
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let mut bytes = Vec::new();
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bytes.extend_from_slice(&0x534D4272u32.to_be_bytes());
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bytes.extend_from_slice(&self.cipher_algorithm.to_le_bytes());
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bytes.extend_from_slice(&self.cipher_key_length.to_le_bytes());
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bytes.extend_from_slice(&self.nonce);
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bytes.extend_from_slice(&self.session_id.to_le_bytes());
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bytes.extend_from_slice(&self.original_message_size.to_le_bytes());
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bytes.extend_from_slice(&self.reserved1.to_le_bytes());
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bytes.extend_from_slice(&self.reserved2.to_le_bytes());
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bytes.extend_from_slice(&self.signature);
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Ok(bytes)
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}
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pub fn read_from_bytes(data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, EncryptionError> {
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if data.len() < Self::SIZE {
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return Err(EncryptionError::DecryptionFailed(
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"Header too short".to_string(),
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));
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}
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let magic = u32::from_be_bytes([data[0], data[1], data[2], data[3]]);
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if magic != 0x534D4272 {
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return Err(EncryptionError::InvalidSignature);
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}
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Ok(Self {
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cipher_algorithm: u16::from_le_bytes([data[4], data[5]]),
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cipher_key_length: u16::from_le_bytes([data[6], data[7]]),
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nonce: {
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let mut n = [0u8; 16];
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n.copy_from_slice(&data[8..24]);
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n
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},
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session_id: u64::from_le_bytes(data[24..32].try_into().unwrap()),
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original_message_size: u32::from_le_bytes(data[32..36].try_into().unwrap()),
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reserved1: u16::from_le_bytes([data[36], data[37]]),
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reserved2: u16::from_le_bytes([data[38], data[39]]),
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signature: {
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let mut s = [0u8; 16];
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s.copy_from_slice(&data[40..56]);
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s
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},
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})
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}
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/// Build AAD = header[0..52], i.e. everything before `signature`.
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fn build_aad(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
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let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(40);
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buf.extend_from_slice(&0x534D4272u32.to_be_bytes());
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buf.extend_from_slice(&self.cipher_algorithm.to_le_bytes());
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buf.extend_from_slice(&self.cipher_key_length.to_le_bytes());
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buf.extend_from_slice(&self.nonce);
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buf.extend_from_slice(&self.session_id.to_le_bytes());
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buf.extend_from_slice(&self.original_message_size.to_le_bytes());
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buf.extend_from_slice(&self.reserved1.to_le_bytes());
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buf.extend_from_slice(&self.reserved2.to_le_bytes());
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buf
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}
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub enum CipherAlgorithm {
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Aes128Gcm = 0x0001,
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Aes128Ccm = 0x0002,
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}
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impl CipherAlgorithm {
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pub fn from_u16(value: u16) -> Option<Self> {
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match value {
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0x0001 => Some(CipherAlgorithm::Aes128Gcm),
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0x0002 => Some(CipherAlgorithm::Aes128Ccm),
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_ => None,
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}
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}
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pub fn key_length(&self) -> u16 {
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16
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}
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/// Number of nonce bytes used by this cipher.
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pub fn nonce_length(&self) -> usize {
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match self {
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CipherAlgorithm::Aes128Gcm => 12,
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CipherAlgorithm::Aes128Ccm => 11,
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}
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}
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}
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/// Per-session SMB3 encryption helper.
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///
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/// Supports both AES-128-GCM (SMB 3.1.1+) and AES-128-CCM (SMB 3.0).
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pub struct Smb3Encryption {
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encryption_key: [u8; 16],
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cipher: CipherAlgorithm,
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}
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impl Smb3Encryption {
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/// Create a new encryption context from the session key and cipher.
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///
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/// Derives the AES-128 key via SP 800-108 KDF.
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pub fn new(session_key: &[u8], cipher_algorithm: CipherAlgorithm) -> Result<Self, EncryptionError> {
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if session_key.len() != 16 {
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return Err(EncryptionError::InvalidKeyLength);
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}
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let encryption_key = Self::derive_encryption_key_sp800108(session_key, b"SMB3ENC");
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Ok(Self {
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encryption_key,
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cipher: cipher_algorithm,
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})
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}
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/// Encrypt a plaintext SMB2 message.
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///
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/// Returns a complete SMB3 TRANSFORM_HEADER + encrypted payload.
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pub fn encrypt_packet(&self, plaintext: &[u8], session_id: u64) -> Result<Vec<u8>, EncryptionError> {
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let nonce_len = self.cipher.nonce_length();
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// Generate random nonce, pad to 16 bytes in the header
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let mut nonce_full = [0u8; 16];
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getrandom::fill(&mut nonce_full[..nonce_len])
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.map_err(|e| EncryptionError::EncryptionFailed(format!("nonce: {}", e)))?;
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let header_no_tag = TransformHeader {
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cipher_algorithm: self.cipher as u16,
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cipher_key_length: 16,
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nonce: nonce_full,
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session_id,
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original_message_size: plaintext.len() as u32,
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reserved1: 0,
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reserved2: 0,
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signature: [0u8; 16],
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};
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let aad = header_no_tag.build_aad();
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// AEAD encrypt: returns ciphertext || tag (last 16 bytes)
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let ciphertext_with_tag = match self.cipher {
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CipherAlgorithm::Aes128Gcm => {
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let nonce12 = GcmNonce::from_slice(&nonce_full[..12]);
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let cipher = Aes128GcmCipher::new_from_slice(&self.encryption_key)
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.map_err(|e| EncryptionError::EncryptionFailed(format!("GCM key: {}", e)))?;
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cipher
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.encrypt(nonce12, GcmPayload { msg: plaintext, aad: &aad })
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.map_err(|e| EncryptionError::EncryptionFailed(format!("GCM encrypt: {}", e)))?
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}
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CipherAlgorithm::Aes128Ccm => {
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let nonce11 = CcmNonce::from_slice(&nonce_full[..11]);
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let cipher = Aes128Ccm::new_from_slice(&self.encryption_key)
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.map_err(|e| EncryptionError::EncryptionFailed(format!("CCM key: {}", e)))?;
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cipher
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.encrypt(nonce11, CcmPayload { msg: plaintext, aad: &aad })
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.map_err(|e| EncryptionError::EncryptionFailed(format!("CCM encrypt: {}", e)))?
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}
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};
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let tag_len = 16;
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let tag_pos = ciphertext_with_tag.len().saturating_sub(tag_len);
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let tag: [u8; 16] = ciphertext_with_tag[tag_pos..]
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.try_into()
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.map_err(|_| EncryptionError::EncryptionFailed("tag extraction".to_string()))?;
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let encrypted_data = &ciphertext_with_tag[..tag_pos];
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let header = TransformHeader {
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signature: tag,
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..header_no_tag
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};
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let mut packet = header.write_to_bytes()?;
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packet.extend_from_slice(encrypted_data);
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Ok(packet)
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}
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/// Decrypt an SMB3 TRANSFORM_HEADER payload.
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///
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/// The cipher algorithm is read from the header's `cipher_algorithm` field,
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/// so this is dispatch-safe — callers don't need to match the algorithm.
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pub fn decrypt_packet(&self, encrypted_packet: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, EncryptionError> {
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let header = TransformHeader::read_from_bytes(encrypted_packet)?;
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let encrypted_data = &encrypted_packet[TransformHeader::SIZE..];
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// Determine cipher from header (prefer the stored self.cipher but
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// also verify the header's opinion matches).
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let cipher = CipherAlgorithm::from_u16(header.cipher_algorithm)
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.unwrap_or(self.cipher);
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let _nonce_len = cipher.nonce_length();
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let aad = header.build_aad();
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// Build ciphertext_with_tag for AEAD verification
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let mut ct_with_tag = encrypted_data.to_vec();
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ct_with_tag.extend_from_slice(&header.signature);
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match cipher {
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CipherAlgorithm::Aes128Gcm => {
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let mut nonce_buf = [0u8; 12];
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nonce_buf.copy_from_slice(&header.nonce[..12]);
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let nonce12 = GcmNonce::from_slice(&nonce_buf);
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let cipher = Aes128GcmCipher::new_from_slice(&self.encryption_key)
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.map_err(|e| EncryptionError::DecryptionFailed(format!("GCM key: {}", e)))?;
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cipher
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.decrypt(nonce12, GcmPayload { msg: &ct_with_tag, aad: &aad })
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.map_err(|_| EncryptionError::InvalidSignature)
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}
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CipherAlgorithm::Aes128Ccm => {
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let mut nonce_buf = [0u8; 11];
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nonce_buf.copy_from_slice(&header.nonce[..11]);
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let nonce11 = CcmNonce::from_slice(&nonce_buf);
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let cipher = Aes128Ccm::new_from_slice(&self.encryption_key)
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.map_err(|e| EncryptionError::DecryptionFailed(format!("CCM key: {}", e)))?;
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cipher
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.decrypt(nonce11, CcmPayload { msg: &ct_with_tag, aad: &aad })
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.map_err(|_| EncryptionError::InvalidSignature)
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}
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}
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}
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/// Derive AES-128 encryption key via SP 800-108 KDF.
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///
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/// Uses the existing [`crate::proto::crypto::kdf::smb2_kdf`] with
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/// Label = `label` (caller includes trailing NUL), Context = empty.
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///
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/// MS-SMB2 §3.1.4.2: `encryption_key = KDF(session_key, label, "")`.
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pub fn derive_encryption_key_sp800108(session_key: &[u8], label: &[u8]) -> [u8; 16] {
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let mut label_with_nul = label.to_vec();
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label_with_nul.push(0x00);
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let context_with_nul = b"\x00";
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crate::proto::crypto::kdf::smb2_kdf(session_key, &label_with_nul, context_with_nul)
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}
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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fn test_encrypt_decrypt_roundtrip(cipher: CipherAlgorithm) {
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let session_key = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16];
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let enc = Smb3Encryption::new(&session_key, cipher).unwrap();
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let plaintext = b"Hello SMB3!";
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let session_id = 12345u64;
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let encrypted = enc.encrypt_packet(plaintext, session_id).unwrap();
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assert_eq!(encrypted.len(), TransformHeader::SIZE + plaintext.len());
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let magic = u32::from_be_bytes([encrypted[0], encrypted[1], encrypted[2], encrypted[3]]);
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assert_eq!(magic, 0x534D4272);
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// Verify cipher_algorithm field in header
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let header_cipher = u16::from_le_bytes([encrypted[4], encrypted[5]]);
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assert_eq!(header_cipher, cipher as u16);
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let decrypted = enc.decrypt_packet(&encrypted).unwrap();
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assert_eq!(plaintext.as_slice(), decrypted.as_slice());
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_gcm_roundtrip() {
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test_encrypt_decrypt_roundtrip(CipherAlgorithm::Aes128Gcm);
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_ccm_roundtrip() {
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test_encrypt_decrypt_roundtrip(CipherAlgorithm::Aes128Ccm);
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_gcm_and_ccm_interop() {
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// Verify packets encrypted with different ciphers produce different wire output
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let session_key = [1u8; 16];
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let plaintext = b"Cross-cipher test";
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let gcm_enc = Smb3Encryption::new(&session_key, CipherAlgorithm::Aes128Gcm).unwrap();
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let ccm_enc = Smb3Encryption::new(&session_key, CipherAlgorithm::Aes128Ccm).unwrap();
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let gcm_packet = gcm_enc.encrypt_packet(plaintext, 1).unwrap();
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let ccm_packet = ccm_enc.encrypt_packet(plaintext, 1).unwrap();
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// Different cipher algorithm IDs in the header
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assert_eq!(
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u16::from_le_bytes([gcm_packet[4], gcm_packet[5]]),
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CipherAlgorithm::Aes128Gcm as u16
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);
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assert_eq!(
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u16::from_le_bytes([ccm_packet[4], ccm_packet[5]]),
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CipherAlgorithm::Aes128Ccm as u16
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);
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// Ciphertext differs (different nonce length → different keystream offset)
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assert_ne!(gcm_packet, ccm_packet);
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// Each cipher can decrypt its own packet via the header-based dispatch
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assert!(gcm_enc.decrypt_packet(&gcm_packet).is_ok());
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assert!(ccm_enc.decrypt_packet(&ccm_packet).is_ok());
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_cipher_algorithm_conversion() {
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assert_eq!(CipherAlgorithm::from_u16(0x0001), Some(CipherAlgorithm::Aes128Gcm));
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assert_eq!(CipherAlgorithm::from_u16(0x0002), Some(CipherAlgorithm::Aes128Ccm));
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assert_eq!(CipherAlgorithm::from_u16(0x0003), None);
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_gcm_authentication_failure() {
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let session_key = [1u8; 16];
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let enc = Smb3Encryption::new(&session_key, CipherAlgorithm::Aes128Gcm).unwrap();
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let encrypted = enc.encrypt_packet(b"Test data", 999).unwrap();
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let mut tampered = encrypted.clone();
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tampered[TransformHeader::SIZE] ^= 0xFF;
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let result = enc.decrypt_packet(&tampered);
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assert!(result.is_err());
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assert_eq!(result.unwrap_err().to_string(), "Invalid transform header signature");
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_ccm_authentication_failure() {
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let session_key = [1u8; 16];
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let enc = Smb3Encryption::new(&session_key, CipherAlgorithm::Aes128Ccm).unwrap();
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let encrypted = enc.encrypt_packet(b"Test data", 999).unwrap();
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let mut tampered = encrypted.clone();
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tampered[TransformHeader::SIZE] ^= 0xFF;
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let result = enc.decrypt_packet(&tampered);
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assert!(result.is_err());
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assert_eq!(result.unwrap_err().to_string(), "Invalid transform header signature");
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_gcm_tag_tampering() {
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let session_key = [1u8; 16];
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let enc = Smb3Encryption::new(&session_key, CipherAlgorithm::Aes128Gcm).unwrap();
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let encrypted = enc.encrypt_packet(b"Test data", 999).unwrap();
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let mut tampered = encrypted;
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tampered[48] ^= 0xFF;
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assert!(enc.decrypt_packet(&tampered).is_err());
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_ccm_tag_tampering() {
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let session_key = [1u8; 16];
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let enc = Smb3Encryption::new(&session_key, CipherAlgorithm::Aes128Ccm).unwrap();
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let encrypted = enc.encrypt_packet(b"Test data", 999).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let mut tampered = encrypted;
|
|
tampered[48] ^= 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
assert!(enc.decrypt_packet(&tampered).is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn test_nonce_uniqueness() {
|
|
let session_key = [1u8; 16];
|
|
let enc = Smb3Encryption::new(&session_key, CipherAlgorithm::Aes128Gcm).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let p1 = enc.encrypt_packet(b"Same data", 1).unwrap();
|
|
let p2 = enc.encrypt_packet(b"Same data", 2).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let nonce1: [u8; 16] = p1[8..24].try_into().unwrap();
|
|
let nonce2: [u8; 16] = p2[8..24].try_into().unwrap();
|
|
assert_ne!(nonce1, nonce2);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn test_ccm_nonce_length() {
|
|
// CCM uses 11-byte nonce (verify the header stores it correctly)
|
|
let session_key = [1u8; 16];
|
|
let enc = Smb3Encryption::new(&session_key, CipherAlgorithm::Aes128Ccm).unwrap();
|
|
let encrypted = enc.encrypt_packet(b"nonce test", 1).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
// The header nonce field is always 16 bytes, but CCM only uses 11
|
|
let nonce: [u8; 16] = encrypted[8..24].try_into().unwrap();
|
|
// Bytes 11-15 should be zero (padding/reserved)
|
|
assert_eq!(&nonce[11..], &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn test_gcm_nonce_length() {
|
|
// GCM uses 12-byte nonce
|
|
let session_key = [1u8; 16];
|
|
let enc = Smb3Encryption::new(&session_key, CipherAlgorithm::Aes128Gcm).unwrap();
|
|
let encrypted = enc.encrypt_packet(b"nonce test", 1).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let nonce: [u8; 16] = encrypted[8..24].try_into().unwrap();
|
|
// Bytes 12-15 should be zero
|
|
assert_eq!(&nonce[12..], &[0, 0, 0, 0]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn test_sp800108_kdf_known_answer() {
|
|
let session_key = [0u8; 16];
|
|
let key = Smb3Encryption::derive_encryption_key_sp800108(&session_key, b"SMB3ENC");
|
|
|
|
let label = b"SMB3ENC\x00";
|
|
let context = b"\x00";
|
|
let expected = crate::proto::crypto::kdf::smb2_kdf(&session_key, label, context);
|
|
assert_eq!(key, expected);
|
|
assert_ne!(key, [0u8; 16]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn test_different_sessions_different_keys() {
|
|
let key1 = Smb3Encryption::derive_encryption_key_sp800108(&[1u8; 16], b"SMB3ENC");
|
|
let key2 = Smb3Encryption::derive_encryption_key_sp800108(&[2u8; 16], b"SMB3ENC");
|
|
assert_ne!(key1, key2);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|